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Regulation and the Multiproduct Firm:
The Case of Telecommunications in Canada
Melvyn Fuss
Leonard Waverman
We report here the results of a theoretical and empirical investigation of
the problems of public regulation when a regulated firm produces more
than one output using common production facilities. Measurement and
interpretation of economies of scale become complex, especially if one
wants to attribute any existing scale economies to a particular product.
1
The problem of efficient pricing in the presence of joint or common costs
is also an issue of concern. These problems, and others, require considera-
tion of the production technology and of the costs faced by the firm. The
natural vehicle for such an analysis is the multiproduct cost function,
since its arguments are outputs and input prices. Recent advances in the
econometric literature (Diewert 1971) have made possible the use of cost
functions to represent general structures of technology. The advent of
multiproduct generalized cost functions could provide an important eco-
nometric supplement to cost-separation studies in regulatory hearings.
2
We discuss theoretical problems associated with analyzing the produc-
tion technology of a multiproduct firm (aggregation of output, economies
of scale, economies of scope, cost separation), give a detailed econometric
specification, and develop a constrained profit-maximizing model of a
regulated telecommunciations firm in which the level of local service
output is chosen by the regulators rather than by the firm. We apply this
model to data generated by Bell Canada during the period 1952-1975.
Rate-of-return regulation creates potential difficulties for estimation of
the production technology. If such regulation is effective, estimates of
parameters of the production technology that ignore this fact may be
biased. We demonstrate how the theory of duality between cost and
production can be used to specify a multiproduct cost function and
associated derived demand functions which explicitly incorporate effects
of rate-of-return regulation.
The Separation of Common and Joint Costs
When firms produce two or more outputs utilizing common or joint
inputs, two problems arise: the allocation of these common or joint costsFuss and Waverman 278
to the separate outputs, and the measurement of aggregate output for the
firm.
Common costs are defined as the costs of common inputs utilized by
two or more outputs, so that the multiproduct transformation function is
represented by
(1)
where Yt(i = 1,... ,ra) are outputs and X} (J — 1,... ,n) are inputs. Were
costs not common, (1) could be rewritten as
(2)
where y = \,...,d,...,h,...,k,...,n.
Joint costs as they are defined in the regulation literature occur when
two or more outputs are produced in fixed proportions; it is impossible to
produce some proportion X of 1 without also producing X of the others
(Kahn 1971). The product transformation curve can then be represented
as
F{Xu...,Xn) = mm{alYua2Y2,...,amYm). (3)
Note that (3) is the limiting case of (1). In the following discussion we
will treat the problems of common and joint costs as the same issue,
referring instead to joint production, as represented by equation (1).
Whether costs are "joint" or whether production is characterized by
fixed coefficients can be tested empirically.
When a firm produces heterogeneous products, there is no single
unique index of output. For an index h(Y) to be formed, the product
transformation function must be written as
F(Yl,...,Ym,Xu...,Xn) = F{h{Y\Xx,...,Xn). (4)
But (4) can be rewritten as F(h(Y),g(x)) — 0, since the existence of an
output aggregate implies the existence of an input aggregate (Brown et al.
1976; Baumol and Braunstein 1977).
3 As a result, the dual joint cost
function is separable in outputs. But then the relative marginal costs of
the outputs are independent of input prices—a strong assumption (see
Lau 1978).Multiproduct Firms: Telecommunications in Canada 279
Most regulated industries involve joint production. Electric utilities
produce peak and off-peak kWh utilizing common generating transmis-
sion and distribution capacity. Railroads use the same roadbed for
passenger and freight traffic. Telecommunications firms provide a wide
variety of services: residential local switched calls, business local switched
calls, residential switched toll calls, business switched toll calls, private
wire service, teletypewriter exchange service, specialized common-carrier
service, and a variety of broadband data services. All switched calls
utilize local exchange switching equipment in common. Toll calls utilize
common interoffice switching equipment and common intercity commu-
nications equipment. Business switched and nonswitched private wire
services all use common intercity plant. These are but several of the many
examples of joint production in the telecommunications sector.
It is difficult to find examples of true joint costs in telecommunications
except in a temporal distribution sense. An increase in the number of
circuits between two points provides increased capacity which is distri-
buted between day and night-time calls in fixed proportions. But this
same increase in peak circuit availability can provide a varying proportion
of business and residential calls, hence the increase in plant is common
to business and residential use but joint between peak and off-peak use.
In the remainder of the paper when we use the term "jointness" we mean
in the production sense, encompassing both common and joint costs as
used in the regulation literature.
Effective regulation poses the following fundamental questions:
• What range of services is best supplied by a single firm? What are the
production economies of scale (the change in average and marginal
costs when firm size is increased)?
4 What are the economies of scope
(the change in average and marginal costs when services are combined
within a single firm)?
5 Economies of scope exist if and only if
production is joint.
• What are the long-run marginal costs of producing one more unit of
any one of the joint outputs (Yt,..., Ym)1
The first set of analyses help determine the size of the firm and the degree
of competition to be allowed ;
6 the second analysis allows the examination
of the efficiency of any rate structure.
Cost Functions, Economies of Scale, and Economies of Scope
The Multiproduct Cost Function
A multiproduct production process can be represented by the product
transformation functionFuss and Waverman 280
..,Ym,Xl,...,Xn) = 0, (5)
where Yt (i = 1,... ,ra) are outputs and Xj(J = 1,... ,«) are inputs.
7
In this section we consider only the case where rate-of-retum regulation
either is not used by the regulatory authorities or else is ineffective. In
either case, we may assume that the firm pursues cost-minimizing behavior
without regard to the possibilities of Averch-Johnson-type distortions. In
that case, the theory of duality between cost and production (see Diewert
1971) ensures that for every transformation function of the type shown
in equation (1) there exists a dual cost function of the form
C=C(Y1,...,Ym,P1,...,Pn), (6)
where Pj(j — 1,...,«) are the prices paid by the firm for the inputs X}—
as long as the product transformation function satisfies the usual regularity
conditions (such as convex isoquants), the firm pursues cost-minimizing
behavior, and the firm has no control over input prices.
Under these assumptions, the cost function is just as basic a description
of the technology as the product transformation (joint production) func-
tion, and it contains all the required information, including information
on jointness.
The properties of the multiproduct cost function (6) are that C is
concave in Pj, linearly homogeneous in P}, and increasing in Y, and Py,
that dC/dPj = Xj (Shephard's lemma) ;
8 and that the own-price elasticities





Economies of Scale and Incremental Costs
The fact that average cost (cost per unit of output) is not defined for
multiple-output technologies makes analysis of returns to scale somewhat
complex, since we can no longer just measure the effect of output increases
on the average cost of production. In addition, we need to distinguish
between economies of scale in some overall sense (that is, when all outputs
are increased) and economies of scale associated with the expansion of a
particular output (with all other outputs held constant). We begin by
considering an overall measure of returns to scale.
"Overall" returns to scale can be obtained by computing
m r\C
dC = I §dY,
i=l
 v
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or
Equation (7) represents the total change in cost resulting from differential
changes in the levels of the m outputs. Unfortunately, unless we add
additional structure to equation (7) it is difficult to interpret changes in
cost resulting from changes in outputs in terms of returns to scale. One
common procedure is to assume that all outputs are increased in propor-
tion; that is, dYi/Yi = d\ogYt = X. Then
(8
) _ A glogC
If dlogCjX > 1, incremental overall costs are increasing and hence pro-
duction is subject to decreasing returns to scale; if d\ogC/X < 1, the
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale; if dlogCjl — 1, overall
constant returns to scale exist.
This overall description of returns to scale is somewhat less relevant
in the multiple-output case than in the single-output case, since it requires
all outputs to be increasing in strict proportion, which may not correspond
to the optimal production plan. Nevertheless, the overall-returns-to-scale
number can be a useful summary statistic for comparing results obtained
from the present framework with returns to scale estimated from aggre-
gate production or cost functions (that is, functions that aggregate all
outputs into a single variable).
Now consider the concept of returns to scale with respect to a single
output. From equation (7),
dlogC = dlogC
dlOgY; 31 —~- ^
Yj, j # ; constant
The term d logC/d log^, the output cost elasticity, represents incremental
or marginal cost in percentage terms.
It is tempting to specify that if
— —^— > 1,
returns to scale in producing the zth output are decreasing; that if
a logy,
 K
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they are constant. This specification would yield the correct trichotomy
for the case of a single-output production process. However, any attempt
to use this definition can lead to a conflict with the definition of overall
returns to scale introduced earlier. Consider the two-output Cobb-
Douglas cost function
C = AY\>Y°2i. (10)
Overall decreasing returns to scale implies
However, d logC/<3 log ^ = a; can be < 1 while a1 + a2 > 1, which leads
to a contradiction between our overall and the proposed output-specific
returns to scale measures. Thus, we must reject the use of the individual-
product cost elasticities as indicators of returns to scale. However, if one
of the cost elasticities exceeds unity, the sum of them will also exceed
unity and therefore no contradiction will arise.
Can we define a meaningful indicator of the potential advantages or
disadvantages of output expansion? Since cost elasticity cannot be used,
the remaining intuitive concept is that of changes in incremental cost. It
would appear, at first glance, that decreasing incremental cost (d
2C/dYf
< 0) should indicate increasing returns to scale. However, we will show
that this marginal-cost concept also does not provide a solution to the
problem of developing an unambigous indicator of scale economies. It




The usual situation is that dlogC/dlogy, < 1. The more disaggregated
the output vector, the more likely it is that 8 logC/d log Yt < 1. If we accept
this case, then an additional sufficient condition for d
2C/dY? < 0 is that
d
2 logC/dlogyf < 0; that is, that cost elasticity is a decreasing function
of output. In all such cases, a highly possible outcome is that marginal
costs with respect to each output will decrease (d
2C/dY? < 0) and, at the
same time, overall returns to scale will also decrease (Lj(d \ogC/d \ogYt)
> 1). In addition, for any given degrees of jointness and overall returnsMultiproduct Firms: Telecommunications in Canada 283
to scale, it is possible (for the case of decreasing cost elasticity) to increase
the rate at which marginal costs decline simply by further disaggregation
of the outputs. These two possibilities should be sufficient warning against
using any observed decreasing marginal cost as an indicator of sub-
product-specific returns to scale. In fact, there exists no unambiguous
measure of output-specific returns to scale except in the case of nonjoint
production,
9 since separate cost functions cannot be constructed when
common costs exist. Thus, we appear to be left with only the overall
measure of returns to scale.
1
0 Unfortunately, this measure is of no value
when one is attempting to evaluate the possible efficiency gains from
increasing the scale of production of one of the outputs in a multiproduct
production process.
Joint Production, Economies of Scope, and Subadditivity
To this point we have assumed that the production technology is truly a
multiple-output one, in the sense that it is more efficient to produce the
m outputs together than by separate production processes. This efficiency
condition (jointness in production) is known in the industrial organization
literature as economies of scope (see Panzer and Willig 1975, 1979; Baumol
and Braunstein 1977).
For the purposes of this paper, we will say that the production tech-
nology exhibits economies of scope if
C(YX-Ym) < C(F1,0--0) + C(0,F2,0---0) + C(0,0,73 •••())
+ •••+ c(o,o---o,ym). (13)
Panzer and Willig (1979) have shown that a sufficient condition for a
twice-differentiable multiproduct cost function to exhibit economies of
scope is that it exhibit cost complementarities, defined by
d
2c
< o (/ ±j\ij= l,...,m). (14)
Conditions (14) provide a means of testing for the existence of economies
of scope.
In a series of articles, Baumol (1977b), Baumol, Bailey, and Willig
(1977), and Panzer and Willig (1977) have established the importance of
"subadditivity of the cost function" as a production characteristic in the
analysis of a regulated monopolist. Unfortunately, a test for subadditivity
is difficult to devise, since one of the requirements is a knowledge of the
cost function in the neighborhood of zero outputs. The closest we canFuss and Waverman 284
come is a (weak) local test in the neighborhood of the point of approxima-
tion. It can be shown that the simultaneous existence of local eco-
nomies of scale and local economies of scope is sufficient to ensure local
subadditivity.
Cost Separation and Econometric Cost Functions
The transcripts of regulatory hearings in the telecommunications sector





In the United States, since some of the telephone plant is under state
jurisdiction and some under federal jurisdiction, it became necessary to
"separate" interstate from intrastate plant. When regulators became con-
cerned with the structure of prices rather then just their average level,
costs of different services had to be separated. The push for entry by
specialized common carriers (SCCs) and AT&T's competitive response
prompted the F.C.C. requests for guidance from affected parties. In
Canada, competitive pressures between two transnational carriers and
suggestions of "cream skimming" and predatory pricing prompted a
lengthy cost inquiry.
Three basic separation formulas have been proposed: embedded direct
cost (EDC), long-run increamental cost (LRIC), and fully distributed
cost (FDC). These formulas are needed in order to assess "correct"
prices. The FDC method is essentially one of long-run average cost
pricing. Two methods have been proposed to fully distributed these




The calculation of average embedded direct costs is equivalent to the
measurement of short-run variable costs. Unless there are no fixed costs,
long-run pricing at EDC will generate losses. FDC in principle takes into
account the fixed costs. However, pricing on the basis of FDC is associated
with a number of problems. Where production is characterized by long-
run returns to scale, setting price equal to average FDC is inefficient
since, for Pareto optimality, prices ex ante should be set equal to long-run
incremental costs. Separating common costs by some measure of relative
use is arbitrary and should not be used as a basis for price setting, since
there is in general no connection between intensity of use and cost
causation.
Cost separation is a bogus issue that exists because of regulatory
commissions' reliance on historical average costs as a guide to setting
price. But there is no method of correctly separating historical averageMultiproduct Firms: Telecommunications in Canada 285
costs. Pricing rules based on efficiency criteria should be set at long-run
incremental costs, thus avoiding any need to "separate" costs.
One must be careful in defining the long run, in order to be certain that
incremental costs are measured in terms of changes in capacity output,
not changes in actual output at less than capacity.
1
4 As an example, let
us examine the data-telecommunications market. Carriers have argued
that the incremental costs of data service are low since it is an adjunct to
the large monopoly switched message service that must be provided for
voice transmission. However, if the quality of the entire system must be
increased to accommodate an acceptable level of reliability for data
transmission, these upgrading costs are attributable to data-service users
and should be fully charged to them alone as part of the incremental
costs of the change in the system. This higher quality of service is provided
jointly to all users, but quality-upgrading joint costs should be solely
allocated to the data-service users.
Can econometric analysis of the retrospective cost functions of telecom-
munications firms provide useful information for regulatory purposes?
In theory, given highly disaggregated data corresponding to true economic
variables in the absence of strong time trends, long-run incremental costs
could be allocated on a historical assigned-cause basis.
1
5
Econometric cost function analysis can be used to examine the response
of a firm at the margin; that is, at the replacement values or opportunity
costs of inputs. Costs are minimized subject to current factor prices.
Regulators, while allowing the firm to use opportunity costs for labor
and materials inputs, insist that the firm earn its allowed rate of return
on the historical cost of the capital stock, not its replacement cost. As a
result, costs and prices as determined under a regime of historical-cost
rate base will differ from the incremental costs and prices determined by
an econometric cost function.
1
6
In a period of inflation, historical costs will be less than replacement
costs. Incremental costs determined econometrically will then exceed
historical "incremental" costs. One of the purposes of cost separation is
to estimate the relative contributions of the various services—that is, the
excess of price over historical cost. Comparing actual prices (those set by
regulators on the basis of historical cost) with incremental replacement
costs is no guide in determining the extent of cross-subsidization inherent
in the actual price structure (when replacement and historical costs
differ).
Incremental replacement costs are, however, a guide to efficient pricing
behavior. Where economies of scale are not present, setting the price forFuss and Waverman 286
each service equal to the incremental replacement cost (as determined by
an econometric cost function) yields the set of subsidy-free Pareto-optimal
prices. If there are economies of scale and the firm is constrained to at
least break even, calculating the set of Ramsey prices on the basis of these
incremental replacement costs leads to the most efficient "constrained"
set of prices, assuming neutrality in interpersonal comparisons (that is,
where distributional consequences are disregarded).
Econometric Specification of a Joint Production Process
Profit-Maximizing Model for a Multioutput Regulated Firm
Estimates of demand elasticities indicate that regulated telecommunica-
tions firms operate some services in the region of inelastic demand.
1
7 But
profit-maximizing monopolies will never produce where marginal revenue
is negative; to do so would require setting marginal revenue equal to
negative marginal costs. If marginal costs are positive, an unregulated
profit-maximizing monopoly finding itself in the inelastic region of de-
mand would raise price (lower output) to increase total revenue.
1
8 How-
ever, many regulated utilities are not able to lower output, since the
regulators insist that certain basic services be offered at prices that force
the monopolist to remain in the inelastic region. One example is passenger
train service. Most railroad firms would wish to reduce passenger service
and raise its price. However, regulators in North America do not permit
rail companies to raise the price of this service to the profit-maximizing
level, although they do require the provision of passenger seats.
All studies of the telephone industry suggest that local telephone service
is characterized by inelastic demand. The observed level of local service and
the corresponding price are chosen not by a profit-maximizing monopo-
list, but by the regulators. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that the
observed level of local service is not an endogenous choice variable to the
firm. Instead, we consider the level of local service exogenous to the firm.
The firm's problem is to maximize profits,
7i = ZqiYi-C(Yu...,Ym,Pu...,Pn), (15)
subject to the constraint on the provision of certain services:
Y^Yt (ieH),
where H is the class of outputs constrained by the regulators, assumed
to be the first H outputs. (Note that if demand were inelastic in the region
of Yh the firm would never decide to offer more than Y^}
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Substituting into the profit expression, we obtain
i$H ieH




MRt = MC( {i = H + l,...,m).




dYt - dY{ '
 K '
For observed output levels such that demand is elastic, we assume that
marginal revenue is set equal to marginal cost. For output levels such
that demand is inelastic, we assume that those outputs are exogenous to
the firm.
The Multiple-Output Translog Cost Function
The translog cost function is becoming an increasingly popular specifica-
tion of the functional form of a cost function (Brown et al. 1976; and
Fuss 1977). The function is quadratic in logarithms and is one of the
family of second-order Taylor-series approximations to an arbitrary cost
function. The multiple-output translog cost function, assuming capital-
augmenting technical change (input n), takes the form
2
2
m n — 1
logC = a0 + X a,-logy; + X ftlogPj + ftlogP*
m m n—1n—1
+ i Z I Wog^iogn + i z Z
i=lfc=l j=lfc=l
n m n — 1
+ i I yjnlogiyog/>* + X I Pylo
(18)
t=i
where a0, a,, j97-, Sik, yjk, pu are parameters to be estimated, and P* = Pne~
et where 0 is the rate of decline in the price of a nominal unit ofFuss and Waverman 288
capital due to capital-augmenting technical change. (In all the following
equations, the asterisk notation is dropped unless it is important for
interpretation.)
Using Shephard's lemma (dC/dPj — Xj), we have
= Mj = fij + lyjk\ogPk + Ipylogl^, (19)
where; = l,...,n and M, is the cost share of the 7th input.
Equations (18) and (19) make up the cost system. However, a number
of features of the system reduce the number of parameters to be estimated.
Since Mj is a cost share,
this implies
= 1. lyjk = 0, j>y = o.
In addition, the linear homogeneity property of cost functions outlined
earlier implies the further parameter restrictions
Finally, the fact that the function is a second-order approximation
implies
The translog cost function can be used along with the profit-maximizing
conditions to generate additional equations representing the optimal
choice of endogenous outputs.




5C^1 _ MR XL - frO + WYj
dYC
 lC lC C '
where e, is the own price elasticity for the /th output. Denoting qt YJC as
Rt, the "revenue share," we obtainMultiproduct Firms: Telecommunications in Canada 289
For the translog system the sum of the Rt is not constrained to be unity,
since the firm is not constrained to earn zero economic profits.
2
4 Using
the translog cost function, the system of equations (21) become
Rt = U + 15alogn + Zpijlogp\ (l + ±) \ (22)
where / = H + 1,... ,m.
Factor Price Elasticity, Incremental Costs, Overall Economies of Scale,
and Economies of Scope with the Translog Cost Function
It can be shown that the own price elasticity of demand for factor j can
be computed as (see Berndt and Wood 1975)
*
A"%Xj jjj — Mj + Mj
_
jj dlogPj
Once jjj is estimated, the above price elasticities are determined. The
incremental or marginal cost elasticity of producing output / is
|^ = a, + lSik\ogYk + Xp,,logP,, (24) 0
1OS
 ri k j
The incremental cost curve for output Yt can be obtained as
L + SulogYt + S 5ik\ogYk + IpylogpJ) , (25)
J
where Yk and Pj are preassigned constant outputs and prices, respectively.
The "overall" returns-to-scale number can be obtained from
dlogC = y d logC
= Z «.• + Z Z **
 lQg n + Z Z PU ^gPj. (26)
i k
Economies of scope or jointness in production can only be tested in
the translog framework using the approximate tests discussed by Denny
and Fuss (1977). The condition is that
5tj = -a^j
when the data have been scaled so that all Yt — Pj — 1 at the point of
approximation.
2
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Specialized Descriptions of Technology and the Translog Cost Function
Three specialized descriptions of technology are often assumed in the
estimation of production structures. The joint production function
F(Yi,...,Ym;X1,...,Xm) = 0 is said to have a separable input-output
structure if it can be written in the form
G(Y1,...,YJ = H(X1,...,XJ. (27)
It can be shown (see Denny and Pinto 1978) that the joint cost function
can then be written in the form
C= C(h(Y1,...,Ym),P1,...,Pn). (28)
It is obvious from equations (27) and (28) that the test for separability is
the test for the existence of an output aggregate. Following Denny and
Fuss 1977, it can be shown that the separability constraints for the translog







A production function is said to be homothetic if input proportions
are independent of scale. Shephard (1953) showed that the cost function
for a homothetic production structure takes the form
C = g(P1,...,Pn)h(Y1,...,YJ. (30)
For the translog approximation used in this paper the homotheticity
constraints are
P12 = P21 = P13 = P31 = P23 = P32 = 0. (31)
Finally, the production structure will be of a Cobb-Douglas form if the
joint cost function can be written as
c = AP^P^P^ rji y|2 Y^. (32)Multiproduct Firms: Telecommunications in Canada 291
For the translog function used in this paper the Cobb-Douglas constraints
are
Sik = Pij = 7jk = 0 (i,j,k,= 1,2,3). (33)
Data
Data pertaining to Bell Canada's operations during the period 1952-1975
were used to estimate the equations of our model. Bell Canada is the
single largest telecommunications firm in Canada, serving in 1975 close
to 8 million telephones in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. For the
majority of services offered, no competition is allowed. However, there
is a range of so-called competitive services, such as data transmission
(where competition with one other firm, Canadian National/Canadian
Pacific Telecommunications, has always existed).
The basic source of all our data is a Bell Canada submission to the
Canadian Radiotelevision and Telecommunication Commission entitled
Response to Interrogatories of the Province of Ontario, Item 101, 12
February 1977, that presents constant-dollar revenues, skill-weighted
manhours, net value of capital, and the associated prices. (This is referred
to hereafter as the BCS.)
Output Data
The BCS gives both constant-dollar (1967 base) and current-dollar
revenues for local services, directory advertising, and three subdivisions
of message toll (intra-Bell, Trans-Canada and adjacent members, U.S.
and overseas). Also included are other toll revenues and miscellaneous
revenues. We used three output measures: local services, message toll
services, and what we label competitive services (the remaining three ser-
vices).
2
6 The aggregate measure of message toll output was derived as a
Divisia index of the three constant-dollar subaggregates using arithmetic
weights. The implicit price index for the toll aggregate service was deter-
mined from the division of current-dollar revenue by the Divisia quantity
index.
An aggregate measure of the quantity of competitive services was com-
puted in a similar fashion by calculating a Divisia quantity index of the
directory advertising, other tolls, and miscellaneous services. The implicit
price index was formed as above—by dividing total current-dollar revenue
from the three services by the quantity index.Fuss and Waverman 292
Input Data
The BCS lists four separate factors: cost of materials, services, rent, and
supplies; indirect taxes; manhour input; and capital input. We call the
first two groups materials and form the aggregate price index as a Divisia
index (arithmetic weights) of the separate components. Table 6 of the
BCS provides a series called "Labour Value, Adjusted for Quality," in
constant 1967 dollars. An earlier memorandum indicates that the method
of adjusting for quality consists of weighting actual man-hours in each of
twenty-eight labor categories by the ratio of the average total hourly
remuneration of that specific group in the base year to the average
remuneration for all groups (the Kendrick method; see Olley 1970).
All hours attributable to contruction are excluded, as are sick leave,
vacations and holidays. This series represents the quantity of labor input
for our study.
Because we could not acquire a comparable "adjusted" series for the
nominal expenditure on labor, we used nominal labor expenditures as
reported in Bell Canada annual reports. As these expenditures included
management salaries, sick pay, vacation pay, and services not included
in the quantity index, the implicit price index was slightly greater than
unity in 1967. We normalized the labor price series to be unity in 1967.
Table 7 of the BCS includes a series entitled "Total Average Net Stock
of Physical Capital in 1967 Values." The earlier Olley (1970) memorandum
describes the process that generated this capital series. For each year
from 1920 on, the age distribution of capital in place was determined in
each of six categories (buildings, central office equipment, station equip-
ment, outside plant, furniture and office equipment, and motor vehicles).
Constant-dollar values were determined by reflating the physical stock
by a Laspeyres price index (1967 = 1.0) for each capital type. Cash,
accounts receivable, and short-term assets less short-term liabilities were
excluded. Total net value of the capital stock in any year is the sum of
the six individual constant-dollar categories.
The user cost of capital (Pk) for our study is calculated as
Pk = />,(/ + S),
where / is the expected long-run real after-tax rate of return applicable
to Bell Canada (assumed to be constant at 6 percent), 5 is the rate of real
economic depreciation (from the BCS), and Pt is the telephone plant
price index (from the BCS).
We have assumed that the expected real rate of return was constant
over the period. Attempting to incorporate an increasing real rate led toMultiproduct Firms: Telecommunications in Canada 293
implausible results. We chose 6 percent as the real rate, but also examined
the effects of the alternative assumptions of 5 percent and 7 percent.
Jenkins (1972, 1977) estimated the actual real after-tax rate of return for
a wide cross-section of Canadian firms over the 1953-1973 period. The
average rate was 6 percent. For the communications sector, the 1965-1969
average real rate was 5.2 percent including capital gains and 7 percent
excluding capital gains. For the 1965-1974 period Jenkins estimated the




For both the demand functions and the augmented-cost-equations system
the method of estimation was iterative three-stage least squares, an asym-
ptotically efficient simultaneous-equations procedure. The instrumental
variables used for the right-hand-side endogenous variables were formed
from the exogenous variables of the two systems: local service output,
input prices, and real income.
Estimates of Elasticities in Demand
We estimated log-linear demand functions of the form
logy;, = ax + MogC^/CPI,) + dt\ogNt, (34)
where Yit (i = 1,2,3) are per capita outputs of local service, toll service,
and competitive services, respectively; qit (i = 1,2,3) are the correspond-
ing output prices; CPI, is the consumer price index; and Nt is real per
capita disposable income in Bell Canada's operating territory.
2
7
Equations (34) can be viewed as first-order approximations to arbitrary
demand functions. We have also assumed that the service in question is
weakly separable from all other goods and services in the individual's
utility or production functions, and that the aggregate price index of
these other commodities can be adequately represented by the consumer
price index.
The three estimated demand functions are
logrlr = -0.489 - 0.721 logfaflr/CPIt) + 0.443\ogNt; R
2 = 0.804,
(0.209) (0.264) (0.264)
log72( = -1.902 - 1.435 log(^2(/CPIt) + 1.095 logty; R
2 = 0.934,
(1.01) (0.451) (0.450)Fuss and Waverman 294
logF3f = -1.261 - 1.638log(q3t/CPlt) + 0.890logiV,; R
2 = 0.780.
(0.200) (0.166) (0.047)
(Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses.)
The above results confirm one of the assumptions of the previous
sections: that Bell Canada operates in the inelastic region of the demand
curve for local services. Therefore, we will assume in the augmented cost
model estimated below that the level of the local service output (Yy) is
exogenous to the firm's profit-maximizing output choice decision.
Estimation of the Augmented Model
The system of equations consisting of the cost function (18), the cost-
share equations (19), and the revenue-share equations (22) was estimated
using the data described in the previous section. The estimated elasticities
for toll (— 1.435) and competitive services (—1.638) were used as extrane-
ous estimates in the revenue-share equations.
Parameter estimates are given in table 6.1, along with the corresponding
standard errors. Goodness-of-fit statistics are given in table 6.2. The
ceofficient representing capital-augmenting technical change, 6 indicates
that augmenting technical change resulted in an annual decrease of 6.7
percent in the effective price of a nominal unit of capital. The rate of
total cost diminution is given by d\ogC/dt = 9Mn, where Mn is the cost
share of capital. The rate is 3.0 percent at the point of approximation
(1964), and ranges from 2.3 percent in 1952 to 3.4 percent in 1975.
Table 6.3 presents the own-price elasticities of demand for the three
factors for the beginning, midpoint, and terminal years, and table 6.4
gives the cross-price elasticities for the middle year. Note the fall in the
capital own-price elasticity over time, the rise in the labor own-price
elasticity, and the constancy of the materials own-price elasticity. These
trends are due to the trends in Bell Canada's cost shares. To demonstrate
this fact, we note that the own-price elasticity (ea) is calculated as
_ 5it 5it + M
2 - Mt
_
The derivative of the ith own-price elasticity with respect to share M{
is
fo = i V»
M
2'
Since yu is a constant, the elasticity will fall as the share increases and
increase as the share falls—a property of any translog cost function.Multiproduct Firms: Telecommunications in Canada 295
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Cost function 0.9991 0.013
Capital cost share 0.9471 0.014
Labor cost share 0.9592 0.012
Toll revenue "share" 0.5260
b 0.008
Competitive revenue "share" 0.9602 0.004
a. SEE: Standard error of estimate.
b. The toll revenue share is approximately constant (at 0.34), which accounts for the low
R
2. The standard error of the estimate, 0.008, indicates a high degree of explanation in
spite of the low R
2.
































Note: In order to interpret the numbers, apply the convention that the effect of a change
in the price of capital is contained in the first row, the effect of a change in the price of labor
is contained in the second row, etc. Thus, the first row consists of elasticities of the form
d\ogXild\ogPk{i = K,L,M).
As the cross-price elasticities indicate, all three inputs are substitutes,
with output held constant. Thus, the cost-function concavity conditions
will be satisfied at the point of approximation, 1964.
Tests of the Structure of Production
Table 6.5 summarizes the tests of the various specialized production
structures discussed above. The tests were performed using the likelihood-
ratio-test. The likelihood-ratio-test statistic, —21og(L1/L0), is distributed
asymptotically as Xr '•> where Lo and L1 are the values of the unconstrained
and constrained likelihood functions, respectively, and r is the number of
additional restrictions contained in the null hypothesis (the degrees of
freedom of the test). Since we view the translog cost function as a second-
order approximation, the tests presented in table 6.5 are approximate
(see Denny and Fuss 1977).
2
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a. The Cobb-Douglas structure is a special case of the homothetic structure, and therefore
is rejected along with the homothetic structure.
b. Not computed.
c. The rejection of constant returns to scale is a rejection in favor of decreasing returns
to scale.
the middle year of the sample, 1964. Since the tests depend on the point
of approximation, when a null hypothesis was not rejected tests were
also performed using the initial year (1952) and the final year (1975) as
points of approximation. Thus, three test statistics appear in table 6.5
for the nonjointness and constant-returns-to-scale hypotheses.
From the results contained in table 6.5 we can reject homotheticity,
the Cobb-Douglas structure, and separability into outputs and inputs as
descriptions of the telecommunications production structure. The rejec-
tion of separability is particularly important, since all previous estimates
utilize this assumption (see, for example, Dobell et al. 1972; Vinod
1976a, b). A surprising result is the acceptance of nonjointness, which
indicates a lack of economies of scope. We can take a closer look at this
test by recalling that economies of scope imply d
2CldYidYi < 0. It can
easily be shown that
8
2C _ C fdlogCdlogC
Yt Yj \d log Yt d log Yj d log ^ log Yj
(35)
If we scale the data so that the point of approximation is characterized
by Pj = Y{ — 1 (i,j = 1,2,3), then equation (35) is negative if a^ +
3^ < 0 (ij = 1,2,3). Table 6.6 presents the estimate of a,aj + <5£j- and
the associated approximate standard errors underlying the test of the
null hypothesis when 1964 is the point of approximation.Fuss and Waverman 298













Although none of the estimates of d
1C\dYidYi is significantly different
from zero, the point estimates of d
2C/dY1dY2 and d
2C/dY2dY3 are nega-
tive. Thus, there is some weak evidence of cost complementarities between
local and toll services, and between toll and competitive services. The
lack of cost complementarity between local and competitive services is
reasonable, in that competitive services consist primary of private line
services, which in Canada are not interconnected with the local switched
network.
The hypothesis that production is subject to constant returns to scale
is not rejected, except at the beginning of the sample period, where there
exists evidence of decreasing returns to scale. The test statistic for the
middle year (1964) is 0.13, which compares with a 5 percent critical value
of 3.84. This implies that the contant-returns-to-scale hypothesis is a
close description on the technology at the point of approximation usually
chosen in studies that use translog functions.
We stated above that economies of scope and economies of scale are
sufficient conditions for subadditivity. Since neither characteristic is
strongly supported by our results, there is also no real evidence to support
the contention that Bell Canada's production process is subadditive.
However, we must emphasize again that our test is local, and hence not
really suitable. In any case, necessary conditions cannot be investigated
within our framework.
Overall Scale Elasticity
The overall scale elasticity (SE) can be measured as
dl
where X is a proportionate increase in outputs (see Panzer and Willig
1975). Table 6.7 presents the estimated scale elasticity and approximate
standard errors for 1952, 1964, and 1975.
2
9 The point estimates indicate
decreasing returns for the first half of the period and increasing returns
for the latter half of the period, but (as shown by the tests in table 6.5)Multiproduct Firms: Telecommunications in Canada 299












are not estimated accurately enough to cause a rejection of the constant-
returns-to-scale hypothesis for the latter period.
The monotonic rising trend in the returns-to-scale parameter is highly
suspect. When we used a rising real rate of return instead of the constant
6 percent that yields the results of table 6.7, the parameter estimates
indicated implausible scale elasticities (negative in some years, impossibly
high in other years). Moreover, the estimates of scale elasticities presented
in table 6.7 are sensitive to changes in the assumed real constant rate of
return. Lowering the rate to 5 percent increased the scale elasticity some-
what (to 0.912 in 1952, 1.06 in 1964, and 1.20 in 1975); however, none of
the values was significantly different from unity. Increasing the assumed
rate to 7 percent lowered the estimate of scale elasticity (to 0.867 in 1952,
0.981 in 1964, and 1.12 in 1975); none of these estimates was significantly
different from 1.0 except for the 1952 estimate.
There are two likely sources of the problems: incorrect specification
of technical change, and omission of capacity-utilization measures. None
of the data available to us allowed us to overcome these problems.
Technical change is likely to be both factor-specific and neutral. When
we tried to incorporate both Hicks neutral and factor-augmenting tech-
nical changes, the variance-covariance matrix of the estimating equations
became ill-conditioned. This problem highlights the difficulty of separat-
ing measures of scale elasticity from general measures of the rate of
technical progress in a highly trended time series.
3
0
Measures of capacity utilization have both theoretical and empirical
limitations. An aggregate output cannot be defined unless the production
function can be separated into inputs and outputs. Thus, capacity output
can only be defined under an assumption that has been rejected by our
empirical results. One could, however, define capacity in terms of the
physical limitations of utilizing capital stock. We had no information that
would have allowed us to account for changes in capital-stock utilization.
The inability to correct for changes in capacity utilization creates problems
for the measurement of production characteristics, particularly economies
of scale. If the utilization rate fell monotonically throughout the period,Fuss and Waverman 300
perhaps because of capital expansion involving lumpy expenditures on
increasingly larger units, the inability to account for capacity utilization
would bias the measure of scale elasticity upward.
The omission of some sources of technical change could also incorrectly
attribute to scale expansions in output that should be attributable to
changes in technology. Even with these two problems, which we feel bias
the estimates of scale elasticity upward in the latter part of the sample
period, no statistically significant economies of scale were found.
Incremental Costs and Their Relationships to Output Prices
Incremental cost curves for each of the three output can be estimated
using equation (25). With the midsample (1964) observations taken as the
fixed values of input prices and irrelevant outputs, the incremental cost
curves were found to be downward-sloping for all three outputs.
3
1
Since the incremental cost elasticities are increasing for all three outputs
(c
2 logC/d log Yf = 5n > 0), at some output level incremental costs must
increase. For all three services the regions of increasing incremental costs
occur at output levels greater than that observed in the sample. We
arbitrarily doubled each of the three outputs, and reestimated the incre-
mental cost elasticities assuming that the observed relationship between
output and costs still held. Marginal-cost curves continued to fall at
these higher outputs.
We do not find it very useful to compare incremental costs with prices
charged for these services for the purposes of examining relative contri-
butions and "cream-skimming" as usually defined in regulatory hearings.
As we indicated previously, these incremental costs are based on replace-
ment or opportunity cost concepts, while the firm is regulated on a
historical capital cost basis. Prices could then be below these incremental
opportunity costs but be above historical fully allocated average costs
as determined in regulatory hearings. Valuing inputs at opportunity costs
(replacement value) might indicate losses when compared with actual
revenue even though the firm was earning its allowed rate of return on
its rate base. In our study, only the cost of capital and the value of the
capital input exhibit differences between historical and opportunity costs.
Though the firm has to pay each unit of labor the opportunity cost in
each year, regulators do not allow the firm to revalue its capital (or rate
base) every year on the basis of replacement value and the opportunity
cost of capital.
However, it is of some interest to compare output price with incrementalMultiproduct Firms: Telecommunications in Canada 301



































cost for the purposes of evaluating the efficiency aspects of rate setting.
Table 6.8 compares prices and marginal costs, where the opportunity
cost of capital used in the calculations is the nominal after-tax realized
rate of return.
In all years of the sample, the actual price for local service was below
the measured incremental replacement cost for that service. In all years,
the actual prices for both toll and competitive services were substantially
above the marginal costs of these respective services. If there were indeed
no economies of scale, marginal-cost pricing would cover all costs. Pricing
at the marginal costs of the services would substantially lower the prices
for toll and competitive services and increase the price of local service. If
there were increasing returns to scale, marginal-cost pricing could not
cover all costs. We cannot calculate the second-best set of Ramsey prices,
constraining the firm to break even, since one of the three services was




Sensitivity of the Empirical Results to Alternative Elasticity Assumptions
The extraneous demand elasticities are estimated from rather ad hoc
specifications. We therefore investigated the sensitivity of all our empirical
results to alternative estimates of demand elasticities. We increased the
absolute value of the point estimates of toll-service and competitive-
service demand elasticities by two standard deviations. The adjusted
demand elasticities are —2.30 for toll service and —2.03 for competitive
services. The parameter estimates did change, but the characteristics of
production did not change in any significant way. The estimates of the
scale elasticity fell marginally (0.98 in 1964 as compared with 1.02 with
the lower demand elasticities; 1.10 in 1975 as compared with 1.14 for our
base-case results).Fuss and Waverman 302
The Behavior of the Multiproduct Firm Subject to Rate-of-Return
Regulation—A Duality Approach
Behavioral Model
Since 1966, Bell Canada has been subject to regulation limiting the
maximum rate of return that may be earned on invested capital. It is
well known that rate-of-return regulation can bias the choice of inputs
away from the cost-minimizing mix. This hypothesis (known as the
Averch-Johnson, or A-J effect) has been tested, somewhat inconclusively,
by Spann (1974), Peterson (1975), and Cowing (1978), among others. If
the hypothesis is correct, then parameters (and hence technological
characteristics estimated from econometric cost functions) will be biased
owing to misspecification of the behavioral model. In this section we
demonstrate the way in which the A-J effect can be explicitly incorporated
into econometric cost functions and the derived cost-share and revenue-
share equations. A unique feature of the derivation is the extensive use of
modern duality theory.
3
3 Suppose the product transformation function is
F(Y1,...,Ym,K,X2,...,Xn) <0, (36)
where K = X1 is the capital stock used to determine the allowed return.
Then the firm's problem is to maximize
Y^ ^jj (37)
subject to (36) and
T,qiYt - ZpjXj <sK, (38)
where qt(i = 1,... ,m) are endogenous output prices and s is the allowed
rate of return. The appropriate Lagrangian expression is
j - PkK + X, (sK - lqiYt
+ X2\_-F(Y1,...,Ym,K,X2,...,Xn)l (39)
If production is technologically efficient and the firm earns exactly the
allowed rate of return, (36) and (38) become equalities. Further, if we
assume that the optimal solution results in nonzero Yt and X-} for all / and
j, then the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a maximum of (37)




~ X,§ = 0, (41)
ldYt
or (42)
where MR, is the marginal revenue of the /th output.
Differentiating (39) with respect to Xx and X2 gives
= sK - YqJi - YpjX: = 0 (43)
and
^= -F(Y1,...,Ym,K,X2,...,Xn) = 0. (44)
From (40) and (41) we obtain





BF IBF p,(l-A.) p*
where /?*, /?*, and /?* are shadow prices of the inputs. Equations (45) and
(46) state that in the optimal solution the firm sets the marginal rate of
technical substitution equal to the ratio of shadow prices. But this con-
dition is just the usual cost-minimization condition, except for the fact
that the prices are shadow prices instead of market prices. The firm can
be viewed as acting as if it minimized cost subject to the shadow prices.
Therefore, by solving equations (43)-(46) we can obtain the producer's
constrained multiproduct cost function,
C* = C*(p*l,...,p*,Ylt...,YJ. (47)Fuss and Waverman 304
Alternatively, utilizing the theory of duality between production and
cost, we can start with the cost function (47) and assume that the producer
acts as if he minimizes cost subject to the outputs and shadow prices
appearing in (47). We know from the marginal conditions (45) and (46)
that this basic duality property is not affected by the use of shadow prices
for the inputs. Of course, the p* are endogenous. However, the point of
the above analysis is to demonstrate that we can treat the producer as
behaving as if the p* were exogenous. The endogenous nature of/?* will
be taken into account in equations (56)—(58). Using Shephard's lemma
once again, we have
J^ = XJ C/=l, ••.,«). (48)
Equation (48) will be used to generate the cost-share equations for the
rate-of-return-regulated firm.
From the above analysis it is clear that equations (43)-(46) determine
the cost-minimization solution subject to the production technology and
the rate-of-return constraints. We will now show that equation (42), which
determines the choice of Yh is just the marginal-cost-equals-marginal-
revenue condition necessary for profit maximization.
From the technology constraint we obtain
Using (40) and (41), equation (42) becomes
m f)F 1 1 "
£ T?










dC = pkdK+ tpjdXj. (51)
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In addition, from (43),
sdK + XpjdXj = d&qiYi) = dR. (52)
Now suppose that only Y, changes, so that dYk = 0(k # /). Then equation
(50) becomes, using (51) and (52),
where
dR = d^qJi) (dYk = 0, k # /).
We can write equation (51) in the form
fri^ • <
52'>
Substituting for X1dFldYi in equation (42), we obtain
MRJCI-AJ - [MC,—AtMRJ = 0,
or
MR,- = MQ. (53)
Thus, equation (42) is just the MR = MC condition in somewhat
disguised form.
The above interpretation of the first-order conditions suggests that the
overall optimization problem can be subdivided into two sequential prob-
lems. First, for any outputs, minimize cost subject to the technology
and rate-of-return constraints. This defines the output expansion path in
terms of shadow-price tangency conditions from equations (40), (41), (43),
and (44). Second, conditional on the optimal input proportions, choose
outputs so as to equate marginal revenue to marginal cost (from equation
(42)).
Because a sequential analysis can be applied in the case of rate-of-
return regulation, the approach used in the earlier sections of this paper
is relevant. That is, first use the cost function to obtain the input demand
equations and then use the profit-maximizing conditions to determine the
optimal Yv.
The constrained cost function C* can be written as
C* = ptK + £ pfXp (54)
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where it is understood that K and X} are optimal (cost-minimizing)
inputs, given pk, pp s, and Yt. C* can also be written as
C* = (pk-XlS)K + j^Pjil-X^Xj
7=2
JXJ - X, (sK + t Pjx)
7=2
= C(pk,p2,...,pn,s,Yl,...,Ym) - kxJLqiYh (55)
or
C — C* + X^TqiYi, where C depends only on observable variables
which are exogenous to the cost-minimization problem. Now
^ (l = 2,...,n), (56)
where we have explicitly recognized the endogenous nature of pf, p*,
and Xx.
Taking derivatives of (55) and substituting in (56) yields
f- = X,0 -A,) - hpjx) ^ - SK
3^ + hq,r) ^
dPl \y
 JJ dPl dPl \^ ) 8Pl
= X,(l —/J, using equation (43).
Thus we have a modified Shephard's lemma:
^jX,) (j = 2,...,n). (57)
We can obtain additional components of the factor-demand equations
by differentiating C with respect to pk and s:
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l dC^djl f \dX^
s dpt 8s \y
qt
 l) ds f




In summary, we can generate the input demand functions and the
Lagrangian multiplier from the cost function using the modified Shep-
hard's lemma:
1^ = ^.(1-^0 (j = 2,...,n),
— - -X K
ds ~
 1 '
This last result was also derived by Peterson (1975), who apparently did
not recognize the additional behavioral equations that could be obtained
from the cost function.
Actual estimating equations can be formed by noting that
Y IV — / (f\\\
il I — ^ / "\ ' V )
which eliminates the unknown Lagrangian multiplier Xl. This multiplier
can be obtained from the above equations as
X\ = —^- hr- • (62)
ds I dpk
The remaining equations in the profit-maximizing model can be obtained
from the equations dR/dYi = dC/dYt, where C is defined as in (55).
The Translog Econometric Model Under Rate-of-Return Constraint
The cost function can be written in the form
C = C(pk,p2,...,pn,s,Yl,...,YJ. (63)
For ease of notation, let pk — p1 and s = pn+v Then the translog approxi-
mation to the cost function (63) isFuss and Waverman 308
m n + 1
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+ i Z Z logPj
m n + 1
+ I Ipyiogy;-iog^. (64)
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= Pn+i + V yn + 1 fclogPk + Z P; n+il°g ^;> (67) k= i ;=I
where Mn+1 = pn+1X1/C is the allowed rate-of-return "cost share."
The cost system to be estimated consists of equations (64) and (66) and
equations of the form
(68)
n + 1 m
+ Z y2kiogA + Z PtfMultiproduct Firms: Telecommunications in Canada 309
Once the parameters have been estimated, Xx can be obtained from the
ratio of (66) and (67). In addition to the cost-share equations, we have,
as before, the revenue "share" equations obtained from the MC, = MR;
optimality conditions:
= a,- + X Sik\ogYk + X pylog^ 1 + -) , (69)
where £t is the own-price elasticity of demand.
Conclusions
Two important issues in regulation are the extent to which a utility is a
natural (that is, competition-excluding) monopoly and the appropriate
rate structure to be used by a multioutput regulated firm. Both issues
require a knowledge of the firm's production technology. We believe
that the most appropriate vehicle with which to estimate technology
with these issues in mind is the multioutput cost function. We have
estimated this function for Bell Canada, assuming no Averch-Johnson
distorting effect.
A number of interesting empirical results emerge. First, the estimates
of the overall scale elasticity are not sufficiently precise to enable one to
reject the hypotheses of increasing, constant, or decreasing returns in
scale. Second, we have not been able to reject the hypothesis of nonjoint
production. The hypotheses of separability between outputs and inputs,
homotheticity, and a Cobb-Douglas framework were, however, all re-
jected. Third, if the underlying technology is in fact a constant-returns-
to-scale technology, efficient (marginal cost) pricing would lead to
an increase in local-service rates and a decrease in toll-service and
competitive-service rates.
The rejection of the most commonly specified functional forms suggests
a need to use flexible forms, such as the translog form, in any estimation
of telecommunications technology. However, for such an application a
more extensive data base than the one available to us is desirable. This is
demonstrated by the fact that our results are not as robust in the face
of alternative assumptions as we would have preferred. What is needed
is time-series data for a cross-section of telephone companies. The need
for this more extensive data base is particularly obvious when oneFuss and Waverman 310
contemplates the estimation of the multioutput cost-function model
which takes into account Averch-Johnson effects.
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Notes
1. For attempts to define multiproduct scale economies see Baumol and Braunstein 1977,
Baumol 1977, and Panzar and Willig 1978.
2. For an application of multiproduct cost functions to U.S. railroad data see Brown
etal. 1976.
3. This proof is taken from Brown et al. 1976, p. 9.
4. We are ignoring for the moment the problems of defining economies of scale, of measuring
output for a firm producing a number of products, and of defining average cost.
5. Baumol et al. (1976) and Baumol and Braunstein (1977) refer to this change as "economies
of scope," such as the economies of integrating a number of products within a firm.
6. They only help since the benefits of a single firm must be compared to the benefits of
competition, product diversity, innovation, and cost minimization.
7. In the case of a single output, m = 1 and equation (1) can be solved explicitly as Yx =
f(X1,... ,Xn), which is the usual form of the production function.
8. For an introduction to duality theory and the use of Shephard's lemma see Baumol
1977a, chap. 14.
9. If production is not joint, then
C(YU.. . ,7m;JP1,... ,Pn) = £ C'(Yt,Plf.. . ,Pn) i=l




is an unambiguous measure of returns to scale.
10. Panzar and Willig (1978) developed a measure of product-specified economies of scale
which may provide a solution to the consistency problem. However, their measure requires
knowledge of the cost function in the region where one or more outputs are zero, and
such output levels are generally unobservable.
11. See Kahn 1970, p. 53; FCC docket 20003 (Cost Separation); FCC docket 18128
(Telepek); FCC Docket 19919; Canadian Transport Commission "Cost Inquiry."
12. We are indebted to M. A. Schankerman for a memorandum entitled "Contributions
and Cream-Skimming in Telecommunications Services."
13. The FCC in 1967 allocated the costs of local loops and switches to inter- and intrastate
service by their relative minutes of use. When this formula resulted in "too low" a figure
for interstate use, it was multiplied by three to reflect the higher "value" of interstate
service (Kahn 1970, p. 153). Actually, to utilize demand elasiticities to determine theMultiproduct Firms: Telecommunications in Canada 311
"opportunity costs" of various joint services may be correct. However, demand studies
indicate that the demand for interstate service is more elastic than that for intrastate service.
Efficient pricing rules would suggest a relative decrease in the price for interstate service.
14. Economies of fill are not related in any way to long-run economies of scale.
15. In the above example, econometric analysis could associate the upgrading changes in
cost with the data users if residential voice traffic did not increase at the same time. However,
were business and residential traffic to increase by the same amount, system-upgrading
costs would be associated with both types of demand. The typical time-series data used in
studies of the telecommunications sector, including data available to us, are too highly
aggregated and time-trended to permit these causal types of relationships to be estimated
with any degree of precision. The required information would be time-series, cross-sectional
data for a number of telephone companies.
16. One cannot use some historical embedded average cost of capital in econometric
analysis, since the firm does not face these average embedded costs at the margin. Maximizing
profits dependent on these embedded costs would yield the incorrect factor proportions
and output decisions based on actual current market prices.
17. See Dobell et al. 1972; Waverman 1977; Houthakker and Taylor 1970.
18. This result is correct as long as demand complementarities among the monopolist's
products are not sufficiently strong that an increase in the price of the product with inelastic
demand so reduces demand for other products that the monopolist's total revenue falls.
19. See note 18 for an applicable qualification.
20. In the case of substitutability or complementarity among the monopolist's products,
marginal revenue would be given by
Since our empirical demand functions did not indicate the existence of the required inter-
relationships, this more general case has been relegated to a note.
21. In the actual estimation, the stability conditions
dY
 < dYi
were satisfied at all data points.
22. We attempted to incorporate Hicks's neutral technical change both instead of and in
addition to capital-augmenting technical change. The attempts proved unsuccessful.
23. It can be shown that if demand interdependence is present,
d logy;. <
where e,; is the cross-price elasticity of demand for product 7, with respect to price q^.
24. Since C is based on opportunity or replacement cost while the firm's actual revenue
is constrainted by historical cost, £/?,- can be less than C with the firm still earning its
allowed rate of return. '
25. See Denny and Pinto 1978. A more detailed description of this test is provided below.
26. The three subcategories contained in the aggregate "competitive" service are other
toll (private line, data communications, broadband, TWX); miscellaneous (consulting and
other services), and directory advertising. Directory advertising was spun off to form aFuss and Waverman 312
separate company at the end of 1971. Our estimation procedure took this exogenous shift
in revenues into account.
27. Although we attempted other formulations incorporating cross-elasticity effects, none
of these attempts proved successful. There was no indication of significant interdependence
among the demands for the three services.
28. The tests for homotheticity and the Cobb-Douglas structure are also exact in the sense
that they do not depend on the point of approximation.
29. Standard errors were calculated as linear approximations. See Kmenta 1971, p. 444.
30. The measures of cost-diminution technical change and returns to scale are both mono-
tonically trended. However, their combined effect on total factor productivity is to produce
an almost constant rate. Ohta (1974) showed that the rate of total factor productivity can
be measured as Ef^
1 • sCt, where eCY is the scale elasticity and £o is the rate of total cost
diminution. The resulting rates of total factor productivity are 2.7 percent in 1952, 2.9
percent in 1964, and 3 percent in 1975.
31. We reemphasize that a falling incremental cost curve is not necessarily associated with
overall increasing returns to scale.
32. Only if an even number of services were subject to inelastic demands would we be
able to calculate a Ramsey price vector. The solution, of course, is to relax the assumption
of constant demand elasticities so that increasing the price of local services will eventually
place the product in an estimated elastic demand region.
33. The approach taken in this section is similar to that used by Cowing (1978). However,
we make more explicit use of duality theory to obtain the estimating equations, and do
not need to assume profit-maximizing behavior with respect to the production of all outputs.
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The article by Fuss and Waverman represents a major step forward in
empirical research in the telephone industry. Their study generates a
number of interesting conclusions, but even more important is the fact
that it applies solid theoretical and empirical techniques to a difficult
problem. The use of a flexible-form cost function and the theory of
duality enables the authors to test a number of propositions which earlier
studies have employed as maintained hypotheses. In addition, the eco-
nometric methods used in the paper are novel applications of well-known
techniques, generally well justified, and help to identify areas where
future research may lead to an even better understanding of the underlying
technology.
Among the most interesting empirical results are the following. The
authors cannot reject the null hypothesis that there are constant returns
to scale in the industry. Neither can they reject the null hypothesis that
there are no economies of scope. They do reject the proposition that
the production function is homothetic, as well as the separability of
inputs and outputs. The authors have also integrated a technical-change
coefficient in their analysis, and conclude that capital-augmented technical
change helped to reduce total cost at an annual rate of about 3 percent
over the period 1952-1975. Finally, they have produced estimates of
marginal cost for three types of services: local service, message toll, and
"competitive" services (private line, broadband, and TWX). They suggest
that local-service tariffs have been less than marginal cost for the period
1952-1975, while the tariffs for the other two service categories have
exceeded marginal costs. They conclude that more efficient pricing would
therefore result from some increase in local-service tariffs and some
decrease in the other tariffs.
The techniques and the conclusions both represent important contri-
butions to our understanding of the technology of telecommunications.
Additionally, they provoke the reader to ask a number of questions
which it may now be possible to answer with the advances in technique
that are used in the article.Comment on Fuss and Waverman 315
Usefulness of Cost Data
It is interesting that Canadian regulators are involved in a cost inquiry
much like the American FCC docket 18128. The alternatives they are
investigating have familiar names: embedded direct cost (EDC), long-run
incremental cost (LRIC), and fully distributed cost (FDC). The most
useful applications of a cost function of the sort estimated by Fuss and
Waverman are in the determination of marginal and total costs, rather
than in the calculation of the three aforementioned costs. The authors
do not claim that the translog function will aid in the quest for EDC
and FDC methodologies. However, they do attempt to describe an
incremental cost function, and certain problems arise in the process. In
equation (25) they state that the "incremental cost curve for output Yt
can be obtained as
lCC(Yt) = ~U + ^logF; + X <5lfclogfk + ZP Ii\ k±i j
where Yk and P-} are preassigned constant outputs and prices, respectively,"
and where C is total cost and the parameters a;, Sih Sik, and pu are
estimated.
Fuss and Waverman have used the terms "incremental cost" and
"marginal cost" interchangeably. They are correct in describing equation
(25) as a local description of the marginal cost of producing Y{. However,
it is necessary to point out that the incremental cost of producing Y{ is
usually defined in regulatory circles as the difference in cost incurred
when producing Y, at some level, as opposed to producing a zero level
of Y{. Formally, this concept of incremental cost is represented for a
two-product case as
ICC*^) = C(YltY2) - C(0,Y2),
where the level of Y2 remains unchanged and factor prices are held
constant and therefore suppressed in the definition of ICC* (Yx).
There is a relationship between the ICC used by Fuss and Waverman
and the more conventional ICC*. In particular, if the estimated para-
meters of the translog function (a,, du, dik, and ptj) were constant over
the range of output of Y, from zero to Yh then
ICC*(y/) - lCCiYJdYt + Ft,Braeutigam 316
where, in addition to the variables already defined, Ft represents a fixed
cost that is not incurred unless Y{ is positive.
The distinction between ICC*(T;) and ICC(Yj) emphasizes two major
points about the translog function. First, since it is a Taylor-series
approximation of a function, it will generally be accurate only locally. The
parameters a,, <)„, Sik, and ptj will generally not be constant as Yt varies
from zero to Yt. Second, the translog function cannot accommodate a
zero as one of its arguments (in particular, Yi = 0), since it involves a
logarithm of zero. Moreover, if avoidable fixed costs are attributable to
a service (such as Ft in the example above), the cost function is not con-
tinuous at Yi — 0. If it is not continuous, then neither is it differentiable
at Yt = 0.
Fuss and Waverman are aware of these limitations. They note that
the local nature of the estimation prohibits their testing for subadditivity
in the cost function. Our purpose here is simply to point out why one
will not be able to infer the usual kind of incremental cost information
referred to by regulators—ICC*—from the estimated cost function.
Joint Production and Economies of Scope
One part of the article that may cause some confusion is the treatment
of "joint production." The authors describe joint production as meaning
that the production function can be written as (equation (3))
,,...,Xn) = mm(a1Y1,a2Y2,...,amYm),
but cannot be written as (equation (2))
*m
 = Fm(Xh+ i, . . . ,Xn),
where the Y variables refer to output levels and the X variables to input
levels. In other words, the authors are characterizing a joint production
process as one in which each input cannot be uniquely attributed to the
production of a particular output.
The first point needing clarification involves the statement that "eco-
nomies of scope exist if and only if production is joint." Economies of
scope may exist in some cases without joint production; thus the "only if"
part of the statement does not appear to be true. For example, consider
the following cost function:Comment on Fuss and Waverman 317
C = 10 + Y, + Y2.
Note that the process involves costs which cannot all be attributed un-






C(4,5) < C(0,5) + C(4,0),
and the cost function does exhibit economies of scope, even though
production is not joint.
The second point involves the statement that "economies of scope
imply d
2C/dYjdYj < 0." The implication is not generally true of cost
functions. For example, consider the cost function
C = F + Yx + Y2,
where F is a fixed, shared cost. Then
C{YUY2) = F+ Y,+ Y2< C(0,F2) + C(Ylt0) = IF + Yt + Y2
and there are economies of scope, even though d
2C/8Y1dY2 •£ 0.
Model Specification
At the heart of the article is an estimation of a translog cost function. The
theoretical basis for the work is presented clearly. Specifically, it is
assumed that the firm minimizes total cost in producing any observed
vector of output, with no effect to the contrary such as an Averch-Johnson
bias. The importance of this assumption is recognized explicitly by the
authors, and a theoretical discussion of the A-J variation is presented in
the concluding section. With this in mind, we confine our comments to
the cost-minimizing model estimated in the article.
Those who have worked with translog cost functions are no doubt
familiar with the property that the number of parameters to be estimated
increases rapidly as the number of outputs and factor prices increases.
Some aggregation is needed to make the model tractable. For example,
the thought of having a translog function that includes factor prices forBraeutigam 318
each of the twenty-eight types of labor mentioned in the paper boggles
the mind! While one might like to see how the empirical results are
affected by, for example, using four or five outputs instead of three, the
authors are constrained by the amount of data they have available. In
light of this, the categories of outputs chosen seem reasonable.
We address two areas of specification here. The first involves the fol-
lowing statement:
For observed output levels such that demand is elastic, we assume
that marginal revenue is set equal to marginal cost. For output levels
such that demand is inelastic, we assume that those outputs are
exogenous to the firm.
In other words, Fuss and Waverman have run a set of separate regressions
to determine the demand schedules for each of the three output categories
selected, and then calculated an elasticity of demand for each. They find
that local service had an inelastic demand, and conclude that price (or
quantity) regulation has in effect made the level of local service exogenous
to the firm.
They find the other two service categories to have elastic demands,
and therefore conclude that these output levels are endogenous to the
firm, determined by profit-maximizing behavior (setting the marginal
revenue equal to the marginal cost) in each market. There exists the
uncomfortable possibility that regulators have specified the price (or
quantity) level in each market at a level such that marginal cost exceeds
marginal revenue, where the marginal revenue remains positive. Restated,
the observation of a nonnegative marginal revenue is a necessary, but
not sufficient condition for the profit-maximizing behavior assumed by
the authors. (This assumes that the outputs are not complements; the
issue of cross elasticities of demand will be addressed below.) Fuss and
Waverman could have reinforced the validity of their endogeneity assump-
tions in these two markets with some additional institutional description
about the way in which the regulatory process does in fact work.
A second potential problem of specification arises from the estimation
of the log-linear demand functions used to provide additional informa-
tion for the estimation of the cost function itself. Fuss and Waverman
have assumed that each service "is weakly separable from all other goods
and services in the individual's utility or production functions, and that
the aggregate price index of these other commodities can be adequately
represented by the consumer price index." Specifically, they have assumed
that the cross-elasticities of demand among the three types of services are
zero. This may or may not be true in the Canadian industry. It is anComment on Fuss and Waverman 319
empirical matter that preferably should be tested rather than asserted as
a maintained hypothesis. For example, competitive services may be im-
perfect substitutes for message toll services, at least for some users. Also,
local service may exhibit some complementarity with respect to message
toll services. At least in principle, if these complementarities were strong
enough, then the observation of an inelastic demand for local service
would not necessarily mean that the level of local service is exogenously
specified. (This possibility is recognized in note 18, but the empirical test
for demand complementarity is not made.)
More broadly, Fuss and Waverman employ a set of revenue-share
equations (equation 22) as part of the system used to estimate the cost
function. The revenue-share equations do not admit the possibility of
cross-elasticities of demand; consequently, the model may be misspecified.
In summary, the effects of this could range from incorrect assumptions
about the endogeneity or exogeneity of each of the various services to
incorrectly specified revenue-share equations. Both could alter the
estimates of the coefficients of the cost function.
Pricing and Economic Efficiency
Fuss and Waverman note that the price for local service appears to be
less than the incremental (or, as I have argued above, the marginal)
cost, over the time period in question. For the message toll and competitive
services the reverse is suggested. If there are no economies of scale (a
possibility not rejected in the paper), then in the quest for economically
efficient prices we need not worry about second best. If we were to set
prices equal to marginal costs, then the firm would break even and
economic efficiency would be maximized.
If there are economies of scale, then second best may be of interest.
Fuss and Waverman state that second-best (Ramsey-optimal) prices
cannot be calculated since local service has a constant elasticity of demand
whose absolute value is less than unity. This by itself does not appear
to be a problem. It is true that the log-linear specification of demands
used by the authors does assume a constant elasticity of demand. Assume
for the moment that there are zero income effects (an assumption con-
tradicted by the empirical results in the article) and zero cross-elasticities
of demand. Then, at a Ramsey optimum, two conditions would hold:




for all i and;,
where
IT = overall level of profit for the firm,
p
l = price of ith service,
MC = marginal cost of ith service,
s
l = price elasticity of demand for ith service.
The constant-elasticity assumptions would simply require that the per-




—would be proportional in each market. The fact that the absolute value
of the price elasticity in any market is less than unity does not preclude
the determination of Ramsey-optimal prices.
The general assertion of Fuss and Waverman that the calculation of
second-best prices may not be possible is correct. The estimates of
parameters may not be constant over the range of outputs between the
prevailing levels and the second-best levels. The calculation would be com-
plicated further by the existence of nonzero income effects, as indicated
by the present estimates, and by nonzero cross-elasticities of demand, if
they exist.
Conclusion
The analysis of Fuss and Waverman casts doubt on a number of prior
studies of the telephone industry, many of which have assumed unrealistic
and restrictive production functions (such as the Cobb-Douglas, a form
they reject), and most of which have characterized telephone operations
with a single, highly aggregated output. They have shown how it is
possible to apply flexible-form cost functions to the telephone industry,
and have suggested that, at least in the Canadian case, there is a real
question as to whether the industry is a natural monopoly. Perhaps more
data and further refinement in the estimating techniques will enable us
to say more about that question. However, the present work alone has
considerably advanced the state of the art of empirical work in the
telecommunications industry.Comment
Bridger M. Mitchell
Melvyn Fuss and Leonard Waverman have given us a stimulating article,
reemphasizing the importance of closely examining the behavior of the
multiple-product firm and focusing our attention on the central difficulties
of analyzing common costs in a regulated market. Their analytic methods
—particularly when developed in more expensive form—promise to be
a welcome addition to the economists' tool kit for addressing public-policy
issues of rate structure, entry and competition, and the appropriate extent
of monopoly supply. However, the article falls short of providing empirical
results bearing on the policy questions that arise in regulation of the
telecommunications sector.
I will briefly review Fuss and Waverman's methodology, and will
comment on the appropriateness of their data as well as their modeling
of regulatory constraints and of demand. I will then suggest how their
econometric methods might be combined with an alternative procedure
for estimating joint cost functions, an approach that holds greater
promise for empirically establishing the long-run parameters of the
production technology in the telecommunications sector.
The Model
Fuss and Waverman assume that three aggregate services (3^) are pro-
duced from three aggregated inputs (Xj) by a general multiproduct
transformation function with convex isoquants:
F{Y,X) = 0, Y ^ (Y1,Y2,Y3), X = (XUX2,XZ\ (1)
Provided that input prices (p) are exogenous, a cost-minimizing firm
will have the dual cost function
C(Y,p), p = (Pi,p2,P3), (2)
which embodies all of the technical information contained in (1).
Fuss and Waverman particularize this model by specifying (2) to be a
general quadratic function in the logarithms of total cost, output, and
price variables (the so-called translog cost function). They assume that
the firm sells its services at uniform prices q, and maximizes profitsMitchell 322
n = Y,qiYi - c (3)
subject to a regulatory constraint to be specified. This behavior implies
a particular structure for the cost shares,
), j =1,2,3 (4)
and the "revenue shares" of the outputs
^ = gt(Y,p,r]), r\ = Oh.^fo), * = 1,2,3. (5)
In their application of this model the authors simultaneously estimate
the parameters of the seven equations in (2), (4), and (5) by iterated
three-stage least squares, assuming that technological change is Hicks-
neutral and that per capita income and Yx (local telephone service)
are exogenous variables. The demand elasticities, rj2 and rj3, for the
endogenous outputs, Y2 and Y3, are estimated from independent demand
equations.
The principal empirical findings are that
• the overall returns-to-scale elasticity is not significantly different from
unity,
• incremental costs are falling for all services,
• all inputs are substitutes,
• there is a lack of economies of scope, and
• price is below incremental cost for local service.
Data
Fuss and Waverman use annual time-series data for Bell Canada for
the period 1952-1975. Output is aggregated into three services: local
(Y:), toll (Y2), and "competitive" (Y3). The last category includes private-
line, data, TWX, and wide-area telephone service (WATS) as well as
directory advertising. For Y2 and Y3, constant-dollar quantity indices
were available, and prices (q2,q3) were computed as implicit indices from
the ratios of current revenues and the quantity indices. The output
measure for local service (which is unexplained) could be either the number
of main telephone stations or the quantity of local calls. Since flat-rate
charges were in effect for most customers during this period, it would be
inappropriate to use demand estimates based on an average price per call.Comment on Fuss and Waverman 323
Inputs are similarly aggregated into three broad categories—materials,
labor, and capital—by constructing annual price indices for each category.
The time-series nature of the data employed by the authors poses a
fundamental question for the interpretation of their results: Are year-
to-year changes in total cost, factor cost shares, and output prices a
reliable basis for estimating the long-run multiproduct production func-
tion? Unfortunately, annual data are dominated by short-run behavior
and often reflect disequilibrium conditions. This extremely capital-
intensive industry is characterized by lumpy and large-scale investment
projects requiring years for systemwide installation. Capacity utilization
("fill") shows significant annual variation. Moreover, the structure of
the firm's output prices is not readily adjusted to reflect year-to-year
changes in both demand conditions and relative prices of inputs. Finally,
the precision of the parameter estimates is restricted by the limited
variation in prices, factor shares, and output proportions observed in
time-series data. At best, then, the data used by the authors could enable
them to estimate the local properties of short-run cost and production
functions.
Regulatory Constraint
The impact of regulation on the multiproduct firm is a challenging topic,
one worthy of extended investigation. Although the Fuss-Waverman
article represents a start in this direction, it does not reach the goal of
analyzing the effect of regulation on a utility's actual behavior.
To formally introduce regulation into a model of a profit-maximizing
multiproduct firm, the authors take two approaches. The first, used in
their empirical work, is to assume that regulation constrains the price
of one output (local service) and leaves the firm free to set the levels of
the remaining prices. Fuss and Waverman choose local service as the
exogenous output because their demand equation obtains an inelastic
price coefficient, and the model cannot function with negative marginal
revenue. The authors' alternative approach, which they develop theoreti-
cally for the translog cost function, is to assume that the firm is subject
to classic rate-of-return regulation on total invested capital.
The difficulty, of course, is that regulators exert (or attempt to exert)
control at many points. Indeed, the accounting procedures for separating
common costs between services are intended to influence the rate levels
of several services, and it is possible that such price regulation would
force a regulated monopoly to operate at inelastic levels of demand inMitchell 324
all markets. However, in an aggregative model one hesitates to use up
more than one degree of freedom to specify the regulatory constraint,
and there is no readily-available theory of regulators' preferences to
specify the degree of price control exerted in each market. It would,
therefore, be interesting to have the results of the authors' second approach
—for a profit-maximizing firm constrained only by rate-of-return reg-
ulation—to examine how closely such a firm's output prices resemble
those observed in the data.
Finally, the authors note that rate-of-return regulation was imposed
on Bell Canada in the middle of the sample period. Did this change in the
firm's regulatory environment influence its costs and product behavior?
Demand
Fuss and Waverman estimate a log-linear equation for the quantity of
each of the three aggregate telecommunication services as a function of
each service's own price and of real income per capita. The authors'
cursory attention to the demand side of the market—they suggest that
their equations be regarded as first-order approximations to arbitrary
demand functions—stands in sharp contrast to their systematic develop-
ment of the implications of joint products on the supply side. In principle,
the demands for local, toll, and "competitive" services are interdependent
and must be represented in the form of a joint demand function,
D(Y,p) = 0. (6)
Several types of interdependencies are likely to be important for the
particular output aggregates Fuss and Waverman use. First, the price
of local service is both the cost to the customer of local calling and the
price of access to obtain toll services, since he must first have a local
telephone in order to place long-distance calls. The demand for toll
services will, therefore, be a function of both local- and toll-service prices,
especially for high-volume toll users who must purchase additional local
lines in order to obtain access to the toll network. Second, some of
the competitive services, particularly WATS, are close substitutes for
message-toll service for high-volume users. The demands for Y2 and 73
should, therefore, each be functions of both q2 and q2. Finally, telephone
service has long been recognized as a case in which important externalities
exist in the demand functions of individual consumers. In the demands
for both local service and message toll service, the number of persons
connected to the telephone network positively affects the demand forComment on Fuss and Waverman 325
access as well as the number of calls at given prices. This externality,
when incorporated into the firm's profit-maximizing calculus, can result
in positive marginal revenues from supplying local service even when
the demand function is apparently inelastic.
A satisfactory empirical investigation of the system of demand equa-
tions relevant to the Fuss-Waverman production structure will be a
challenging undertaking. Over the period 1952-1975 important structural
changes have occurred in telephone services. The introduction of direct
distance dialing and of off-peak discount rates for toll calls has had a
pronounced effect in stimulating message-toll traffic. Similarly, the avail-
ability of WATS and discount rates for bulk toll service and the recent
emergence of competitive carriers for specialized intercity services have
affected the conventional message-toll market as well as the market for
other telecommunication services. Realistic estimates of the demand
structure will need to incorporate at least the basic nature of these trends.
One can well sympathize with the authors for avoiding the additional
difficulties posed by the simultaneity of demand and cost functions in
a complete representation of their model. Nevertheless, it is clear that if
the multiproduct firm's price policy is endogenous in its production
decisions, then one may not without further investigation assume that
prices are predetermined in using market data to estimate the system of
demand equations that it faces.
An Alternative Approach
As an alternative to the direct econometric estimation of production or
cost functions for the multiproduct firm, one may incorporate the major
characteristics of the firm's joint production technology into a process
model. In the telephone industry such an approach has been developed
by S. C. Littlechild ("Peak-Load Pricing of Telephone Calls," Bell Journal
of Economics and Management Science 1 (1970): 191-210). A process
model incorporates multiple outputs Yt and a technology consisting of
items of equipment Ki with maximal capacities Kj. In such a model,
particular pieces of equipment are in common use for multiple outputs.
For example, A^, the local loop and switch, provides capacity that is
shared between local and toll services. The capacity constraints are that
usage, when summed over the set of outputs Bj that use each item of
equipment, not exceed the available capacity,
I Yt ^ Kj. (7)
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Each item of equipment is associated with a long-run cost function that,
in general, may incorporate economies of scale and factor substitution,
Cj(Kj,p). (8)
When a particular set of regulatory constraints is imposed, the process
model is optimized for a specified objective function. For example, the
firm may be assumed to maximize profits:
n = l<liYi - I.CJ(KJ,P)- (9)
i j
As outputs, the process model yields the quantities and prices of market
services, the levels of inputs, and the shadow price of each service. An
important feature of the process-model approach is that the shadow
prices may be interpreted as the long-run marginal costs of expanding
the output of each service.
It is possible to combine the econometric and process approaches.
Beginning with the process model, one may vary the input prices or-
thogonally over a wide range to generate minimum-cost solutions for
joint production. (The model may also be used to introduce new tech-
nologies, different regulatory constraints, or the entry of competitors).
The prices and outputs of these solutions constitute pseudodata that
embody the firm's long-run responses to differing market conditions.
One can then use these pseudodata to econometrically estimate a smooth
multiple-output cost or production function, such as the translog function.
Such a function will summarize the production technology into a small
number of parameters representing the degree of scale economies, the
nature of input substitution, and the character of expansion paths. This
alternative approach of combining process information with econometric
specifications avoids many of the problems inherent in time-series data,
including multicollinearity, limited sample variation in key variables,
and the presence of disequilibrium behavior.
J. M. Griffin's initial study of multi-output production in the electric
power industry ("Long-run Production Modeling with Pseudo Data:
Electric Power Generation," Bell Journal of Economics 8 (1977): 112-127)
suggests that the psuedodata approach can elucidate policy questions
that depend on the empirical measurement of long-run parameters.
Although Fuss and Waverman's time-series analysis does not yield
reliable information on these questions, the application of their meth-
odology in conjunction with a process model is a promising line of
future inquiry.Comment on Fuss and Waverman 327
This comment is an elaboration of my discussion of the paper "Multiproduct, Multiinput
Cost Functions for a Regulated Utility: The Case of Telecommunications in Canada,"
by Melvyn Fuss and Leonard Waverman, presented at the conference. Preparation of
these remarks has been supported by a fellowship from the German Marshall Fund and by
National Science Foundation grant APR 77-16286 to the Rand Corporation.